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INTRODUCTION
No other ethical dilemma is as vexing as the conflict between
the duty to keep client confidentiality and the duty to prevent a
client from committing a crime or perpetrating a fraud.' Accord-
ing to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, "[a] lawyer shall not
reveal information relating to representation of a client unless
the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that
are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation
.... -2 It adds, however, that "a lawyer may reveal such informa-
tion to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to pre-
* J.D. Candidate, May 1999, Fordham University School of Law.
1. See Sanders M. Chattman & Deborah S. Kinburn, Ethical Dilem-
mas Confronted By Environmental Attorneys: When the Duty To Keep A Client's
Confidence Is Not Absolute, 322 PLI/REAL 425, 427 (1988).
2. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(a) (1983)
[hereinafter MODEL RULES].
Rule 1.6, Confidentiality of Information, reads as follows:
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to repre-
sentation of a client unless the client consents after consulta-
tion, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in
order to carry out the representation, and except as stated in
paragraph (b)
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the
lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act
that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death
or substantial bodily harm; or
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the law-
yer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client, to es-
tablish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against
the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was in-
volved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding con-
cerning the lawyer's representation of the client.
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vent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer
believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily
harm . . . . "3 The lawyer must face the ethical dilemma inherent
in balancing the maintenance of confidentiality against the dis-
closure of confidential information. 4 The ethical issues faced by
environmental lawyers may be more complicated due to (1) the
public and political nature of most environmental law litigation,
and (2) the relative "youth" of the settled body of environmental
law and the continuing creation of new legal and doctrinal
principles. 5
In environmental law, the attorney may face a conflict between
maintaining confidential information and disclosing information
in order to protect innocent third parties from environmental
hazards. Federal laws reflect the seriousness of environmental
pollution by imposing criminal sanctions for certain environmen-
tal crimes. 6 Exacerbating the dilemma for attorneys is the grow-
ing risk of tort liability for professionals who fail to warn non-
clients of dangers and the ambiguity of many environmental
3. Id.
4. See Ilona L. Dotterrer, Attorney-Client Confidentiality: The Ethics of
Toxic Dumping Disclosure, 35 WAYNE L. REV. 1157, 1158 (1989). See gener-
ally MODEL RULES, pmbl. Subsection [1] states:
A lawyer is representative of clients, an officer of the legal
system and a public citizen having special responsibility for
.the quality of justice.
Subsection [8] states:
In the nature of law practice, however, conflicting responsi-
bilities are encountered. Virtually all difficult ethical
problems arise from conflict between a lawyer's responsibili-
ties to clients, to the legal system and to the lawyer's own in-
terest in remaining an upright person while earning a satis-
factory living. The Rules of Professional Conduct prescribe
terms for resolving such conflicts. Within the framework of
these Rules many difficult issues of professional discretion
can arise. Such issues must be resolved through the exercise
of sensitive professional and moral judgment guided by the
basic principles underlying the Rules.
5. See James R. Arnold et al., Disclosure of Environmental Liabilities to
Government Agencies and Third Parties, CA47 A.L.I.-A-BA 381, 458 (1995).
6. See Dotterrer, supra note 4, at 1160-61.
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laws.7 Furthermore, the Model Rules assume that harm resulting
from any client has limited impact.8
There may also be a conflict between federal laws and the eth-
ical rules, as illustrated in CERCLA's emphasis on remedial ac-
tion reinforcing disclosure of a client's past violation.9 Here, a
client's failure to disclose a release is a crime, whether the viola-
tion occurred in the present or past.10 On the other hand, the
attorney may only disclose a client's crime if the effects of the
crime are still being felt or the crime itself is not complete.1 In
order to properly address the mandates of CERCLA, the environ-
mental attorney needs to consider various factors (e.g., agency,
past v. current crime) in determining disclosure of client
confidences.
Part I of this Note discusses CERCLA and confidentiality issues
related to CERCLA. Part II presents an overview of relevant prin-
ciples regarding confidentiality issues in environmental law. The
relevant principles include: (1) Model Rule 1.6 and its interac-
tion with other rules (Model Rules 4.1 and 3.3); (2) broad versus
narrow conceptualizations of confidentiality; (3) continuing ver-
sus past crime; (4) ethical rules and possible conflict with other
laws; (5) agency; and (6) prosecutorial considerations. Part III
presents a model, organizing these issues for the environmental
attorney's examination of specific cases of confidentiality. Some
of the relevant factors in this model include consideration of ad-
ministrative agencies and regulations, potential or actual third
party victims, and prosecutorial considerations. Finally, the
model will be applied to three fact patterns, focusing on issues
raised by CERCLA.
7. See Irma S. Russell, Cries and Whispers: Environmental Hazards,
Model Rule 1. 6, and the Attorney's Conflicting Duties to Clients and Others, 72
WASH. L. REv. 409, 414 (1997).
8. See id. at 454.
9. See Nicholas Targ, Attorney Client Confidentiality in the Criminal
Environmental Law Context: Blowing the Whistle on the Toxic Client, 14 PACE
ENvTL. L. REv. 227, 260 (1996).
10. See id.
11. See id. (citing ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Respon-
sibility, Informal Op. 1470, at 396 (1981)).
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I. CERCLA AND ISSUES OF CONFIDENTIALITY RELEVANT TO
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
The courts have applied the common law in novel ways to ad-
dress harm to human health and the environment caused by in-
dustrial pollution. However, the private, fact-specific and gener-
ally retrospective nature of tort and other common law remedies
have been inadequate. 12 Civil common law remedies have been
particularly inadequate to the task of addressing harm to human
health caused by hazardous wastes, providing neither redress for
widespread public harms nor a mechanism for insightful antici-
patory intervention. 13 Even if damages were an appropriate rem-
edy, the traditional common law measures of injury do not fully
internalize costs caused by environmental violations, because of
lack of information and "large numbers" problems. 4 Further-
more, they do not take into account non-economic values. 5 In
order to address environmental violations, agencies and courts
have aggressively applied federal environmental statutes in ac-
tions against polluters and have expanded the use of older com-
mon law criminal provisions. 16
Among the, acts utilized by agencies and courts is the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA). 17 This act requires notification by the "person(s) in
charge"'" about the release of hazardous substances. 9 Section
12. See id. at 233-34.
13. See id. (citing ZYGMUND J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
AND POLICY: NATURE LAW AND SOCIETY 241 (1st ed. 1992).
14. See id. at 235.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1996).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a) reads as follows:
(a)Notice to National Response Center upon release from
vessel or offshore or onshore facility by person in charge;
conveyance of notice by Center
Any person in charge of a vessel or an offshore or an on-
shore facility shall, as soon as he has knowledge of any re-
lease (other than a federally permitted release) of a hazard-
ous substance from such vessel or facility in quantities equal
to or greater than those determined pursuant to section 9602
of this title, immediately notify the National Response Center
[Vol. IX
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established under the Clean Water Act [33 U.S.C.A. § 1251 et
seq.] of such release. The National Response Center shall
convey the notification expeditiously to all appropriate Gov-
ernment agencies, including the Governor of any affected
State.
19. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9603(c), reads as follows:
(a)Notice to Administrator of EPA of existence of storage,
etc. facility by owner or operator; exceptions; time, manner,
and form of notice; penalties for failure to notify; use of no-
tice or information pursuant to notice in criminal case.
Within one hundred and eighty days after December 11,
1980, any person who owns or operates or who at the time of
disposal owned or operated, or who accepted hazardous sub-
stances for transport and selected, a facility at which hazard-
ous substances (as defined in section 9601(14) (C) of this ti-
tle) or has been accorded interim status under, subtitle C of
the Solid Waste Disposal Act [42 U.S.C.A. § 6921 et seq.], no-
tify the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency of the existence of such facility, specifying the
amount and type of any hazardous substance to be found
there, any known, suspected, or likely releases of such sub-
stances from such facility. The Administrator may prescribe
in greater detail the manner and form of the notice and the
information included. The Administrator of the existence of
any such facility shall notify the affected State agency, or any
department designated by the Governor to receive such no-
tice, of the existence of such facility. Any person who know-
ingly fails to notify the Administrator of the existence of any
such facility shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.
In addition, any such person who knowingly fails to provide
the notice required by this subsection shall not be entitled to
any limitation of liability or to any defenses to liability set out
in section 9607 of this title: Provided however, that notifica-
tion under this subsection is not required for any facility
which would be reportable hereunder solely as a result of
any stoppage in transit which is temporary, incidental to the
transportation movement, or at the ordinary operating con-
venience of a common or contract carrier, and such stop-
page shall be considered as a continuity of movement and
not as the storage of a hazardous substance. Notification re-
ceived pursuant to this subsection or information obtained
by the exploitation of such notification shall not be used
against any such person in any criminal case, except a prose-
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101 (20) (A)20 identifies parties liable under CERCLA as "persons"
owning or operating a hazardous waste facility. Under section
101(21) of CERCLA, a "person" is defined as "an individual,
firm, corporation, association, partnership, consortium, joint ven-
ture, commercial entity, United States Government, municipality,
commission, political subdivisions of a State, or any interstate
body."21 While these two sections may stipulate who may be a re-
sponsible "person" under the Act, section 107(a) defines four
classes of individuals who would be liable as "owners and opera-
tors" of waste facility sites under CERCLA. 22 These parties in-
clude current owners and operators of waste site facilities, past
owners and operators of waste site facilities, generators of hazard-
ous waste, and those who accept waste for purposes of transport-
ing it to disposal facilities. 23
The requirement of a "release" or a "threatened release" has
not been difficult for the government to meet.24 CERCLA defines
"release" as "any spilling,- leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting,
emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or
disposing into the environment," including the abandonment or
discarding of barrels of containers of hazardous substances. 25 The
statute exempts the following types of releases: (1) any release
which results in exposure to persons solely within a workplace;
(2) emissions from the engine exhaust of motor vehicles, rolling
stock, aircraft, vessels, or pipeline pumping stations; (3) release
of source, byproduct or special nuclear material from a nuclear
incident or from any processing site pursuant to the Atomic En-
ergy Act; and (4) the normal application of fertilizer.26
cution for perjury or for giving a false statement.
20. See John P. Dragani, Apportioning Liability for the Cleanup of Haz-
ardous Waste Sites Under The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation and Liability Act, 1 VILL. ENVTL. LJ. 537, 541 (1990) (citing 42
U.S.C. § 9601(20) (A)).
21. See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21)).
22. See id. at 541-42 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)).
23. See id.
24. See Theodore L. Garrett, Superfund Liability and Defenses: A 1992
Primer, 6 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 3 (1992).
25. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22)).
26. See id.
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CERCLA specifically authorizes the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) to take "response" actions to decrease any actual
or threatened release of a hazardous substance. 27 It enables EPA
to exercise Presidential authority in identifying active and aban-
doned hazardous waste sites across the country.28 Further, the
EPA also enlists the assistance of the Justice Department in
bringing action against potentially responsible parties, to reim-
burse Superfund for its cleanup costs.2 9 In addition to authoriz-
ing cleanup actions by the EPA, CERCLA provides funds via the
Hazardous Substance Superfund to pay for federal response
actions.30
CERCLA does not require the alleged violator to know that a
release violated the law. 31 The statute "demands only that the
defendant be aware of his acts. ' 32 CERC[A places an affirmative
and continuing duty upon responsible persons, for preventive
purposes, to report unauthorized releases. Further, responsible
parties are strictly liable.33 Finally, the government may levy crim-
inal penalties for violations of CERCLA.34
The CERCLA defendant must prove the availability of one of
three categories of affirmative defenses found in section 107(b)
27. See Michael P. Healy, Direct Liability for Hazardous Substance
Cleanups Under CERCLA, 42 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 65, 69 (1992) (citing
42 U.S.C. § 9604(a) (1)). Response actions fall into either of two catego-
ries: "removal" actions, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23), which are short-term ac-
tions to prevent or mitigate damage to human health or the environ-
ment as a result of the release or threatened release of a hazardous
substance, and "remedial" action, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24), which may in-
clude a variety of cleanup acts focused on long-term, permanent rem-
edy at a site.
28. See Dragani, supra note 20, at 540 (citing Exec. Order No.
12,286, 46 Fed. Reg. 9901 (1981)).
29. See id. at 541 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675).
30. See Healy, supra note 27, at 69-70.
31. See Targ, supra note 9, at 242 (citing United States v. Laughlin,
10 F.3d 961, 966-67 (2d Cir. 1993).
32. Id.
33. See Healy, supra note 27, at 72.
34. See id. (citing Roger Colton et al., Seven-Cum-Eleven: Rolling the
Toxic Dice in the U.S. Supreme Court, 14 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 345, 374
(1987)).
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of CERCLA.35 If he cannot, he will then be forced to take re-
sponsibility for the cleanup of a hazardous waste site. 36 Section
107(a) of CERCLA establishes the basic elements of liability.37
The statute sets forth that when there is a release or threatened
release of a hazardous substance from a facility that causes the
incurrence of response costs, responsible parties are liable inter
alia for:
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the
United States Government or a State . . . not inconsistent with
the national contingency plan; (B) any other necessary costs of
response incurred by any other person consistent with the na-
tional contingency plan; (C) damages for injury to, destruction
of, or loss of natural resources .... -"38
CERCLA's emphasis on remedial action reinforces disclosure
of a client's past dumping.39 Thus, a client's failure to disclose a
35. See Dragani, supra note 20, at 542 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)).
CERCLA section 107(b) provides:
There shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this sec-
tion for a person who can establish by a preponderance of
the evidence that the release or threat of release of a hazard-
ous substance and the damages resulting therefrom were
caused solely by:
(1) an act of God;
(2) an act or war;
(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an em-
ployee or agent of the defendant, or than one whose act or
omission occurs in connection with a contractual relation-
ship, existing directly or indirectly, with a defendant (except
where the sole contractual arrangement arises from a pub-
lished tariff and acceptance for carriage by a common car-
ier by rail), if the defendant establishes by a preponderance
of the evidence that (a) he exercised due care with respect
to the relevant facts and circumstances, and (b) he took pre-
cautions against foreseeable acts or omission of any such
third party and the consequences that could foreseeably re-
sult from such acts or omissions; or
(4) any combination of the foregoing paragraphs).
36. See Dragani, supra note 20, at 542-43 (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 9613(f) (1)).
37. See Garrett, supra note 24, at 3 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4); see also Garrett, supra note 24, at 3.
39. See Targ, supra note 9, at 260.
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release is a crime, whether the violation occurred in the present
or past.4 0 On the other hand, the attorney may only disclose a
client's crime if the effects of the crime are still being felt or the
crime itself is not complete.41
In order to properly address this conflict, the environmental
attorney needs to consider various factors (e.g., agency, past ver-
sus current crime) to make the proper determination regarding
disclosure of client confidences.
II. RELEVANT PRINCIPLES REGARDING CONFIDENTIALITY AND
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
There appears to be no single standard for determining how
much information an attorney should disclose to a regulatory
agency.42 Rather, different circumstances require different du-
ties. 43 At present, several issues have been regularly discussed in
the literature, including: (1) Model Rule 1.6 and its interaction
with other rules (Model Rules 4.1 and 3.3); (2) broad versus nar-
row conceptualizations of confidentiality; (3) continuing versus
past crime; (4) ethical rules and possible conflict with other laws;
(5) agencies; and (6) prosecutorial considerations. Although
many of these issues are also relevant to non-environmental con-
fidentiality issues, they take on a particular significance and rele-
vance in environmental law.
A. Model Rule 1.6
As noted, Model Rule 1.6 maintains that a lawyer is not to re-
veal information related to his/her representation of a client.
The exception is when s/he reasonably believes it is necessary to
prevent the client from committing a criminal act that is likely to
result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm." The prin-
ciple of confidentiality is embodied in two related principles: (1)
the attorney-client privilege (and the corresponding work-
40. See id.
41. See id. (citing ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Respon-
sibility, Informal Op. 1470 at 396 (1981)).
42. See Michelle D. Jordan, Counsel's Duty to Disclose and Liability for
Environmental Risks and Audits, 445 PLI/LnG. 857, 869 (1990).
43. See id.
44. MODEL RULES Rule 1.6(b) (1).
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product doctrine) in the law of evidence; and (2) the rule of
confidentiality established in professional ethics.45 They apply not
merely to matters communicated in confidence by the client, but
also to all information relating to the representation, regardless
of the source.4 6 Further, the duty of confidentiality continues
even after termination of the attorney-client relationship.47
As broad and encompassing as Model Rule 1.6 may be, its ap-
plication becomes further complicated when circumstances in-
voke other Model Rules.4 8 In particular, an American Bar Associ-
ation Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility
elucidated the possible interaction of Model Rule 1.6 with Model
Rules 3.3 ("Candor Toward the Tribunal") ,'49 3.9 ("Advocate in
45. See id. cmt. 5; see also Mary C. Daly, To Betray Once? To Betray
Twice?: Reflections on Confidentiality, A Guilty Client, An Innocent Con-
demned Man, and an Ethics-Seeking Defense Counsel, 29 Lo. L.A. L. REv.
1611, 1613 (1996).
46. See MODEL RULES Rule 1.6(b) (1), cmt. 5.
47. See id. cmt. 22.
48. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, For-
mal Op. 93-375 (1993).
49. MODEL RULES Rule 3.3. Rule 3.3 (Candor Toward the Tribunal)
reads as follows:
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a
tribunal;
(2) fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when dis-
closure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudu-
lent act by the client;
(3) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the
controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly ad-
verse to the position of the client and not disclosed by op-
posing counsel; or
(4) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a
lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to know of
its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures.
(b) The duties stated in paragraph (a) continue to the con-
clusion of the proceeding, and apply even if compliance re-
quires disclosure of information otherwise protected by rule
1.6.
(c) A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer rea-
sonably believes is false.
(d) In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the tri-
[Vol. IX
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Nonadjudicative Proceedings"),50 and 4.1 ("Truthfulness in State-
ments to Others")." Under all of these provisions, a lawyer may
not tell a lie, regardless of whether it may be necessary to pro-
tect client confidences. 52 However, it is unclear whether and to
what extent a lawyer in a regulatory proceeding has an ethical
obligation to disclose information that would be against the cli-
ent's interests or would otherwise breach confidentiality.5 3 While
Rules 3.3, 3.9 and 4.1 all impose a duty to disclose information
when such disclosure is "necessary to avoid assisting a criminal
or fraudulent act by a client," this duty overrides the duty to pro-
tect client confidences only under Rules 3.3 and 3.9.54
As these rules allow for various interpretations, the issues may
be further elucidated by consideration of broad versus narrow
conceptualizations of confidentiality.
B. Broad Versus Narrow Conceptualizations of Confidentiality
The legal profession has long debated the scope of the confi-
bunal of all material facts known to the lawyer which will en-
able the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or
not the facts are adverse.
50. Id. Rule 3.9. Rule 3.9 (Advocate in Nonadjudicative Proceed-
ings) reads as follows:
A lawyer representing a client before a legislative or adminis-
trative tribunal in a nonadjudicative proceeding shall disclose
that the appearance is in a representative capacity and shall
conform to the provisions of rules 3.3(a) through (c), 3.4(a)
through (c), and 3.5.
51. Id. Rule 4.1. Rule 4.1 (Truthfulness in Statements to Others)
reads as follows:
In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not
knowingly:
(a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third
person; or
(b) fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when dis-
closure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudu-
lent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by rule
1.6.
52. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, For-
mal Op. 93-375 (1993).
53. See id.
54. See id.
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dentiality duty.5 5 Under a broad view of confidentiality, the attor-
ney can make the client's values primary and remain silent,
thereby allowing any harm from the client's conduct to occur.56
On the other hand, a narrow view permits the attorney to dis-
close a client's confidences to prevent harm, thereby giving pref-
erence to the interests of third parties who may be harmed by
the client's conduct.57
There are two justifications for a broad duty of confidentiality:
(1) social utility and (2) vicarious responsibility.5 8 Social utility
provides that an attorney better serves society when s/he can of-
fer clients "professional refuge," even though withholding impor-
tant information from the public.5 9 It suggests that the client,
with the understanding of confidentiality, will disclose more in-
formation to the attorney; thus, allowing 'the attorney to modify
the client's conduct in a way that benefits society.60 Vicarious re-
sponsibility minimizes the attorney's moral role in the attorney-
client relationship by limiting it to his/her choice of clients,
which is entirely within the attorney's control.61 Thus, the attor-
ney may exercise his/her moral beliefs concerning the selection
of clients. However, once the attorney makes his/her choice, s/
he must suspend moral evaluation in client representation.
The narrow view of confidentiality maintains that an attorney
should serve the client in a manner consistent with his/her own
morals.6 2 The potential impact of environmental hazards, which
may affect enormous numbers of individuals over an undetermi-
nable period of time makes this issue unusually important.
55. See Dotterrer, supra note 4, at 1158.
56. See id. at 1172-73.
57. See id. at 1173.
58. See id.
59. See id. (citing SISSELA BoK, SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS OF CONCEAL-
MENT AND REVELATION 122 (1983)).
60. See id. at 1173-74 (citing MODEL RULES, pmbl., Rules 1.0 cmt.,
1.6 cmt.).
61. See id. at 1174 (citing Monroe H. Freedman, Personal Responsi-
bility in a Professional System, 27 CATH. U. L. REv. 191, 204-05 (1978)).
62. See id.
[Vol. IX
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A consideration of broad versus narrow conceptualizations of
confidentiality elucidates the breadth of the issues. However, the
attorney clearly also needs to evaluate the breadth of the facts.
C. Continuing Versus Past Crime
If a client's conduct poses a significant risk and appears to be
a continuing, rather than a past, crime the attorney may disclose
the relevant information 63 necessary to prevent a crime which s/
he reasonably believes the client intends and is likely to result in
imminent death or substantial bodily harm.6 However, the law-
yer may not disclose confidential information regarding the past
act of a client, no matter how clearly illegal and serious, if all of
the harmful consequences of the act have already occurred.65
The lawyer may take preventive measures, even though some act
has already occurred, if some material, harmful consequence of
the act has not yet been inflicted on a victim. 66 This adds a twist
to the dilemma as environmental offenses are often ongoing,
causing difficulty in determining whether a crime is one in the
past or future.6
7
After consideration of the ethical rules and the facts, the attor-
ney obviously must consider the interaction of other laws.
63. See Chattman & Kinburn, supra note 1, at 439.
64. MODEL RULES Rule 1.6, cmt. 14 reads as follows:
The lawyer's exercise of discretion requires consideration of
such factors as the nature of the lawyer's relationship with
the client and with those who might be injured by the client,
the lawyer's own involvement in the transaction and factors
that may extenuate the conduct in question. When practical,
the lawyer should seek to persuade the client to take suitable
action. In any case, a disclosure adverse to the client's inter-
est should be no greater than the lawyer reasonably believes
necessary to the purpose. A lawyer's decision not to take pre-
ventive action permitted by paragraph (b) (1) does not vio-
late this Rule.
65. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS,
§ 117A, cmt. (a) (1996).
66. See id. cmt. (d).
67. See George W. Van Cleve, Environmental Law in the 1990s and Its
Principal Implications for Professional Responsibility, C534 A.L.I.-AB.A. 405,
417-18 (1990).
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D. Model Rules Versus Jurisdictional Rules
Under the Model Rules, an attorney may keep almost all infor-
mation obtained in the course of representation confidential, as
the duty to disclose is discretionary.68 However, the laws of client
confidentiality differ in many particulars from one jurisdiction to
another.69 Several jurisdictions require the attorney to make a far
more careful examination of the facts at hand and the potential
consequences of nondisclosure. 70 This examination may lead to a
less permissive and more mandatory obligation to disclose client
information. 71 Thus, the environmental attorney needs to under-
stand the governing ethics rules and case law of the jurisdiction
in which the representation occurs. Furthermore, the attorney
must consider agency enforcement in environmental laws.
E. Agency
Between 1984 and early 1989, the firm Kaye, Scholer repre-
sented Charles Keating Jr.'s Lincoln Savings & Loan Association
(Lincoln)72 Lincoln later collapsed, costing taxpayers $2 billion
and the court sentenced Keating to ten years in prison for dup-
ing Lincoln depositors into buying high risk junk bonds which
later became worthless. 73 In 1992, the Office of Thrift Supervi-
sion (OTS) brought a $275 million lawsuit against Kaye,
Scholer.74 The OTS maintained that the firm had a duty to dis-
close material facts involving risky underwriting practices and the
overstated financial position of Lincoln. 75 In pursuing the firm,
the OTS was able to rely on a Federal Home Loan Bank Board
(FHLBB) regulation.76 The OTS argued that the firm played an
active role during an examination process, functioning as an
68. See Chattman & Kinburn, supra note 1, at 443-44.
69. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAw GOVERNING LAWYERS, ch.
5 (1990) (Introductory Note).
70. See Chattman & Kinburn, supra note 1, at 443-44.
71. See id.
72. See Jordan, supra note 42, at 860.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See id. at 861.
76. See id.
[Vol. IX
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agent for Lincoln. 77
Six days after the lawsuit, the firm, without admitting liability,
settled the suit for an astounding $41,000,000 fine. 78 Many com-
mentators maintained that the case against Kaye, Scholer was es-
pecially strong, because the government inherited the thrift's at-
torney-client privilege when it seized Lincoln. 79 That meant the
government had access to documents that Kaye, Scholer pre-
pared for Lincoln.80 Thus, the government could waive the privi-
lege and use the materials against the law firm."1
To the extent that federal statutes have similar provisions in
environmental law, an environmental attorney may run the risk,
under the Kaye, Scholer rationale, of having reporting obligations
imposed directly upon him/her.82 According to the Restatement
(Third) of Law Governing Lawyers, a lawyer may use or disclose
confidential client information when required by law after the
lawyer takes reasonably appropriate steps to assert that the infor-
mation is privileged or otherwise protected against disclosure.83
Environmental attorneys must realize that they cannot make ethi-
cal determinations based on state ethical codes alone.8 4 Increas-
ingly, they must consider the constraints imposed by agency
rules, which regulate clients' conduct. 5 This issue may arise in
pretrial discovery or in supplying evidence to a legislative com-
mittee, grand jury, or administrative agency,86 as occurred to Kaye,
Scholer through the OTS. Finally, the attorney must consider
how the environmental laws are enforced.
77. See id.
78. See id. at 862.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See id. at 868.
83. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 115
(1996).
84. See Jordan, supra note 42, at 875.
85. See id.
86. See id. at 868.
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E Prosecutorial Considerations
An environmental attorney, when determining whether to dis-
close a client's confidence, may need to account for the factors
considered in a federal prosecutor's decision to indict a pol-
luter.87 The prosecutor's decision to bring criminal charges is
largely subjective and discretionary.88 Generally, federal agencies
charged with the enforcement of environmental laws recognize
two types of noncompliance offenses:89 (1) "foot-dragging" or
"bumbling ignorance" 90 ; and (2) the more serious intentional,
substantial violation of environmental laws.91 Regarding factors in
consideration of prosecution, the prosecutor examines: (1) the
severity of the public and environmental harm;92 (2) the degree
of knowledge, willfulness and recalcitrance on the part of alleged
violators; (3) past illegal conduct; (4) the duration of the of-
fense; (5) the ability of the suspect to comply with pollution con-
trol laws; and (6) the deterrent effect of a civil penalty.93 Depend-
ing on the attorney's control or knowledge of the client's
intended conduct, federal environmental laws may impose spe-
cial obligations to disclose a client's environmental violations. 94
The Justice Department, for example, will investigate the extent
of a lawyer's involvement in willful, illegal environmental
activity.95
87. See Dotterrer, supra note 4, at 1161.
88. See id. at 1170 (citing Robert I. McMurry & Stephen D. Ram-
sey, Environmental Crime: The Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Envi-
ronmental Laws, 19 Lo. L.A. L. REV. 1133 (1986), reprinted in 18 LAND
USE & ENVTL. REV. 427, 455 (1987)).
89. See id. at 1168 (citing James W. Moorman, Criminal Enforcement
of the Pollution Control Laws, in ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT 26, 29
(ABA Standing Comm. on Envtl. L. 1978)).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1169 (citing Christopher Harris et al., Criminal Liability
for Violations of Federal Hazardous Waste Law: The "Knowledge" of Corpora-
tions and Their Executives, 23 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 203 (1988)).
92. See id. at 1170 (citing Moorman, supra note 89, at 27).
93. See id. at 1171 (citing McMurry & Ramsey, supra note 88, at
455-56).
94. See id. (citing McMurry & Ramsey, supra note 88, at 455).
95. See Dotterrer, supra note 4, at 1171-72 (citing Norton F. Ten-
nille, Jr., Criminal Prosecution of Individuals: A New Trend in Federal Envi-
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III. SYNTHESIS OF LITERATURE INTO COMPREHENSIVE MODEL
This Note proposes a larger comprehensive model of confi-
dentiality-based consideration and integration of the following
factors: (1)Model Rule 1.6 and its interaction with other rules
(Model Rules 4.1 and 3.3); (2) broad versus narrow conceptual-
izations of confidentiality; (3) continuing versus past crime; (4)
ethical rules and possible conflict with other laws; (5) agencies;
and (6) prosecutorial considerations. The environmental attor-
ney, when confronted with the issue of confidentiality, examines
these various factors in making a determination of whether or
not to disclose client information. This Note submits a model,
based on the current literature, by which the environmental at-
torney may systematically analyze each relevant factor and the in-
teraction of the factors to a particular environmental issue. In
particular, the model may be utilized when the environmental at-
torney confronts federal statutes (e.g., CERCLA), imposing the
disclosure of client information.
In order to demonstrate the possible utility of this model, this
Note presents three confidentiality hypotheticals and applications
of the proposed model to evaluate issues of confidentiality. Fur-
thermore, the analysis will incorporate some general considera-
tions that CERCLA invokes in the confidentiality analysis.
Hypothetical Case 1
The client, a public utility, is operating a coal-fired facility
whose electrostatic precipitator does not function properly. Oper-
ation of the facility would violate its air permits and/or applica-
ble emission standards. The client's facility manager informs the
lawyer that the client used the malfunctioning precipitator in the
past to meet load requirements without the lawyer's knowledge.
It is not being used presently, but the lawyer has discovered that
the facility will be utilized for a discrete time period in the im-
mediate future. It apparently will be used to meet load require-
ments because of a developing heat wave. This conduct would
constitute a criminal offense. 96
ronmental Enforcement?, in ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT 20 (ABA Stand-
ing Comm. on Envtl. L. 1978)).
96. See NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION (NYSBA), ETHICS AND EN-
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Analysis of Hypothetical Case 1
First, according to Model Rule 1.6, the attorney would not
have an obligation to disclose confidential information about the
past crime. However, the attorney has discovered the intent to
commit a crime when he learned that the facility will be used for
a discrete period of time in the immediate future to meet load
requirements. Nevertheless, the lawyer may decide that the crime
is unlikely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily
harm. The determination of whether to reveal information,
which may prevent the client from committing a crime likely to
result in substantial bodily harm, if not imminent death, may re-
quire the attorney to form a belief as to matters concerning
whether there is a diversity of opinion among scientific experts.97
Furthermore, even if the crime was likely to result in such harm,
Model Rule 1.6 makes the decision to disclose discretionary.
Second, the attorney also needs to consider whether to take a
broad versus a narrow view of confidentiality. As discussed, the
duty of confidentiality in the context of environmental crimes
should not be absolute, but it should be balanced against the
harm caused by nondisclosure. 98 The attorney needs to evaluate
the competing rationales and bases underlying a broad and nar-
row view of confidentiality. In the present case, the attorney may
consider the benefit of vicarious responsibility (the minimization
of the attorney's moral role in the attorney-client relationship by
limiting it to his/her choice of clients),99 and weigh this against
the potential harm from using a faulty electrostatic precipitator
for a discrete period of time. The attorney may also want to
weigh the potential harm from using this faulty precipitator
against the benefit (i.e. to meet electricity demands because of a
developing heatwave). It appears that the utility's motive and de-
sired outcome are for a societal benefit rather than mere per-
sonal gain.100 Hence, this may not threaten a narrow view of con-
VIRONMENTAL LAW: CASE STUDIES 15 (1991).
97. See David Sive et al., Particular Ethical Problems in Environmental
Litigation, SB64 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 229, 242 (1997).
98. See Dotterrer, supra note 4, at 1161.
99. See id. at 1174 (citing Freedman, supra note 61, at 204-05).
100. MODEL RULES Rule 1.13(b) reads as follows:
If a lawyer for an organization knows than an officer, em-
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fidentiality where the attorney's conscience and sense of morality
come into play. As illustrated, inclusion of this factor in the anal-
ysis facilitates consideration of the potential costs and benefits of
different approaches to confidentiality. It also facilities considera-
tion of the attorney's moral position on these issues.
Third, as discussed, the attorney additionally needs to consider
whether there is continuing versus past crime. This adds a twist
to the dilemma, as environmental offenses are often ongoing,
causing difficulty in determining whether a crime is one in the
past or future. 10' It appears that the utility's past use may not
have continuing effects, which may argue against disclosure of in-
formation. However, if the attorney determines that the client's
conduct met a high level of danger and is a continuing crime,
the ABA Model Rules permit the attorney to disclose the relevant
information. 10 2 The analysis requires the consideration of this fac-
tor because exclusion may result in the disregard of the nature
of a given hazardous element and the range of potential conse-
quences. Reliance upon only the first two factors could lead the
environmental attorney to neglect the potential long-term effects
of a hazardous element.
Fourth, as argued, states may require the attorney to make a
far more careful examination of the facts at hand and the poten-
ployee or other person associated with the organization is
engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act in a mat-
ter related to the representation that is a violation of a legal
obligation to the organization, or a violation of law which
reasonably might be imputed to the organization, and is
likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, the
lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best in-
terest of the organization. In determining how to proceed,
the lawyer shall give due consideration to the seriousness of
the violation and its consequences, the scope and nature of
the lawyer's representation, the responsibility in the organiza-
tion and the apparent motivation of the person involved, the
policies of the organization concerning such matters and any
other relevant considerations. Any measures taken shall be
designed to minimize disruption of the organization and the
risk of revealing information relating to the representation
to persons outside the organization.
101. See Van Cleve, supra note 67, at 417-18.
102. See Chattman & Kinburn, supra note 1, at 439.
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tial consequences of nondisclosure.10 3 Hence, the attorney cannot
rely primarily on his/her interpretation of only the Model Rules.
In the present case, facts indicate that the client's conduct would
constitute a crime.
Fifth, in the present case there is no mention of any agency
regulations. However, at this juncture, the attorney must also
consider the possible impact of CERCLA. As noted, this act re-
quires notification by both the facility and the "person(s) in
charge" 10 4 when hazardous substances have been released.10 5
CERCLA places an affirmative and continuing duty upon respon-
sible persons, for "preventive" purposes, to report unauthorized
releases.10 6 Hence, CERCLA indicates that the client is responsi-
ble for reporting both the past and the intended unauthorized
releases.10 7 On the other hand, the attorney may only disclose a
client's crime if the effects of the crime are still being felt or the
crime itself is not complete.10 8 Again, the attorney would need to
make some determination about the nature of the violation and
the degree of hazard it poses for the public.
This aspect of the problem illustrates the potential conflict be-
tween agency-enforced laws and ethical principles. Although
there is no clear and simple resolution, consideration of the
prior factors (e.g., ethical rules, broad versus narrow conceptual-
ization of confidentiality, continuing versus past crime) may pro-
vide the attorney with further arguments toward one position or
the other regarding disclosure of confidential information. In
particular, the interaction of agency-enforced laws and ethical
principles may be balanced by considering potential harmful ef-
fects, which may be accounted for when considering whether the
act is a continuous or past crime.
Sixth, the attorney must further account for prosecutorial con-
siderations. The attorney, for example, may determine that the
103. See id. at 443-44.
104. 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a).
105. Id. § 9603(c).
106. Id. § 9603(a).
107. See Targ, supra note 9, at 260 (client's failure to disclose a re-
lease is a crime whether the violation occurred in the present or past).
108. See id. (citing ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Respon-
sibility, Informal Op. 1470 at 396 (1981)).
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client is committing an act of "foot-dragging" by not fixing its
electrostatic precipitator. However, its intent to continue the use
of the precipitator may be a willful, substantial violation of envi-
ronmental laws. The prosecutor may view this violation as not
particularly harmful to the public welfare and the duration of
the act as relatively minimal. However, the client may be viewed
as maintaining a high degree of knowledge, willfulness, and re-
calcitrance. The prosecutor may also take into account the fact
that the client has a history of committing this same act. Further,
the client arguably could have readily fixed the malfunctioning
precipitator, avoiding any possible harmful effects, and the deter-
rent effects of any civil penalty may be somewhat ineffective.
Thus, the present conduct would appear to be a significant
prosecutorial issue. As noted, the prosecutor's decision to bring
criminal charges is largely subjective and discretionary.10 9 Exclu-
sion of this factor in the analysis would ignore the potential
criminal liability which environmental violators may face. Inclu-
sion of this factor is necessary to facilitate consideration of the
client's intent with the act(s). The prior factors (e.g., ethical
rules, broad versus narrow conceptualizations of confidentiality,
agency) may not have led to a consideration of intent.
Finally, the damage sought to be prevented is not easily com-
pensable economic damage, but potentially irreparable harm to
health and ecology.110 As argued, among the factors to be consid-
ered when deciding whether to disclose confidential information
are the severity of the public and environmental harm (including
the type of waste and the location of the site). 1 In the present
case, the release from the electrostatic precipitator may not be
one leading to potentially irreparable harm. Further, the attor-
ney would need to know the location of the precipitator and
weather conditions that may influence the potential harm from
the release.
In summation, the facts of the present case may lead the envi-
ronmental attorney to maintain confidentiality. Despite the fact
109. See Dotterrer, supra note 4, at 1170 (citing McMurry & Ram-
sey, supra note 88, at 455).
110. See Lucia Ann Silecchia, Ethical Dilemmas for the Environmental
Lawyer as Policy Maker, SB52 AL.I.-A.BA 717, 719 (1997).
111. See Van Cleve, supra note 67, at 416.
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that a crime was committed, the lawyer may balance the wrong
with the potential benefits of the act. Further, it is not clear
whether there are any continued effects of the crime. As illus-
trated, several principles must be considered by the environmen-
tal attorney before coming to this conclusion. Exclusion of one
of the factors (e.g., prosecutorial considerations) may lead the at-
torney to neglect critical issues (e.g., the intent of the client)
necessary for consideration of breach of confidentiality.
CERCLA indicates that this client has an obligation to report
the act; whereas not reporting results in the commission of a
crime. Thus, despite consideration of several principles, the envi-
ronmental attorney still faces the conflict between the ethical
principles and federal statute. Nevertheless, consideration of all
of the factors provides more information to facilitate the balanc-
ing between the agency-enforced laws and the ethical principles.
Hypothetical Case 2
The client is an industrial organization that spills a large
amount of hazardous materials, constituting a "release" under
several federal, state, and local environmental laws. The organiza-
tion chooses to contain the spill privately and remove the materi-
als without reporting to any environmental agency.12
Analysis of Hypothetical Case 2
According to Model Rule 1.6, the attorney would be under no
obligation to disclose the large amounts of hazardous materials
since it was part of a past crime. However, unlike the previous
hypothetical, this case involves a spill of "a large amount of haz-
ardous materials," raising the question of the potential harm to
the. public welfare and ecology. In these circumstances, consider-
ation of the second factor (i.e., broad versus narrow conceptual-
ization) may lead the attorney to be more willing to consider a
narrow ("moralistic") view of confidentiality. Although the client
is taking responsibility to contain the spill and remove the mater-
ials, it may be necessary to report the violation in order to facili-
tate security of public safety. Further, the social utility of main-
112. NYSBA, supra note 96, at 17.
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taining confidentiality may be vitiated as the client may not be
amenable to recommendations by the attorney to alert the
proper officials. The client has already chosen to contain the
spill without reporting to any environmental agency. Inclusion of
the second factor in the analysis may provide the attorney with
greater perspective in considering options with breach of confi-
dentiality. Further, the consideration of the second factor may
also facilitate consideration of the next factor.
The present case presents an example of the difficulty in dis-
criminating between a continuing and a past crime, the third
critical factor for the analysis. It may be unclear whether the past
spillage of large amounts of hazardous materials is an event of
present concern. This certainly may be a violation of such a "se-
rious" nature that the costs of violating confidentiality are far
outweighed by the benefits of mediation and the prevention of
possible future effects from this violation. Consideration of this
factor may prompt the environmental attorney to research the
potential effects from the particular act. The information col-
lected from such research may help in evaluating the first two
factors (i.e., ethical rules and broad versus narrow
conceptualization).
Fourth, jurisdictional rules clearly are an important considera-
tion for the attorney in this case, as the spill was a violation
"under several federal, state, and local environmental laws." In-
clusion of this factor may lend even further weight toward disclo-
sure, as the attorney needs to consider the impact of both fed-
eral, state and local laws on this act.
Fifth, as argued, the environmental attorney must consider the
impact of agency-enforced laws. In the present circumstances,
CERCLA would compel disclosure of the spill, as it involves the
release of hazardous material in the past. Furthermore, the attor-
ney may disclose a client's crime if the effects of the crime are
still being felt or the crime itself is not complete." 3
Sixth, regarding prosecutorial considerations, the attorney
should consider that a prosecutor would see the present viola-
113. See 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a); Targ, supra note 9, at 260 (citing ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Professional. Responsibility, Informal Op. 1470 at
396 (1981)).
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tion as a willful violation of environmental laws. Further, a prose-
cutor would recognize the severity of the public and environ-
mental harm. What is not so clear from this hypothetical are the
issues of the duration of the offense and the ability of the sus-
pect to comply with environmental laws. Again, inclusion of the
sixth factor in the analysis allows increased depth of considera-
tion of other factors (e.g., agency). In this circumstance, the at-
torney may consider the characteristics of the act itself in rela-
tion to intent. Recognition of CERCLA in light of prosecutorial
approaches provides further support for the confidentiality
balance.
Finally, as argued, there must be a strong consideration of the
impact of the violation upon third parties. Further, an attorney
would have to consider the potential harm of not reporting the
violation to environmental agencies who may have the expertise
in preventing further harm to the public and the environment.
Unlike the previous case, the facts of the present case are not
as favorable toward maintaining confidentiality. Regardless, sev-
eral principles must be considered by the environmental attorney
before coming to this conclusion. In particular, this case involves
a spill of "a large amount of hazardous materials," requiring the
consideration of the potential harm to the public welfare and
ecology. However, it is still not clear whether there are any con-
tinued effects of the crime. Nevertheless, as noted, CERCLA re-
quires notification by the "person(s) in charge"11 4 about the re-
lease of hazardous substances."1
This example again illustrates how the inclusion of these fac-
tors facilitates increased depth of analysis. Each additional factor
may flesh out different aspects of another factor. Again, the addi-
tional information drawn from such an analysis may foster the
fine balancing the environmental attorney must exercise'when
considering confidentiality.
Hypothetical Case 3
An industrial client's foundry disposed of materials containing
lead and organic matter behind the foundry property. It did so
114. 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a).
115. See id. § 9603(c).
[Vol. IX
CERCLA AND CONFIDENTIALITY
from the 1940s to 1950s, conforming with then-standard operat-
ing practices in the industry. The foundry closed, and several
years later the building was leased to another manufacturer. The
industrial client now discovers documents describing its past dis-
posal practices and wishes to check the property for possible
contamination. The property is not listed on either federal or
state lists as a hazardous waste site. 1 6
Analysis of Hypothetical Case 3
First, Model Rule 1.6 would not compel the attorney to make a
disclosure, as the conduct occurred in the past. Further, it is not
clear whether a violation of any sort has actually occurred. At is-
sue is a possible violation, which the industrial client wants to as-
sess. Second, in choosing between a broad versus a narrow con-
ceptualization of confidentiality, the attorney may want to
consider maintaining a broad conceptualization. This conceptual-
ization is the most appropriate, as it is unclear whether the client
committed a violation. Further, it appears that the attorney is
dealing with a client who wants to "do the right thing" by investi-
gating whether it contaminated the leased property.
Hence, consideration of a broad versus narrow conceptualiza-
tion of confidentiality may afford the attorney the opportunity to
examine his/her moral beliefs in light of the actual circum-
stances of the case. In the present case, it may allow the attorney
to consider his/her values in light of the fact that the client is at-
tempting to "do the right thing." Reliance primarily on the first
factor, without examining possible varying perspectives, may have
led the attorney to examine the facts in an analytical vacuum
that would possibly favor disclosure. Consideration of the second
factor leads the attorney to further consider both society and the
client.
Regarding the third factor, consideration of a continuing ver-
sus a past crime, some may argue that the improper disposal of
lead and organic matter on property subsequently leased to an-
other is sufficient cause to believe that a past action has continu-
ing effects. Thus, the attorney may be dealing with a continuing
crime, whereby s/he may take preventive measures, even though
116. See NYSBA, supra note 96, at 21.
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some act has already occurred, if some material and harmful
consequence of the act has not yet been inflicted on a victim. 1 7
However, again it is unclear whether there are continuing ad-
verse effects resulting from the client's past actions. Again, con-
sideration of this factor may prompt the environmental attorney
to research the potential short-term and long-term effects from
the particular act. The information collected from such research
may help in the balance between the first two factors.
In addition, the fact that the disposal of the lead and organic
matter was within legal parameters complicates the analysis.
Hence, obligations to report, under CERCLA standards, are not
clear, as there was not a past violation of law. Nevertheless, there
may be a continuing violation of current environmental stan-
dards. The continuation' of a violation may compel the attorney
to disclose this information.
In terms of the fourth factor, there were no jurisdictional laws
stated in this hypothetical. Nevertheless, as previously argued,
these laws must be considered in the analysis.
As to the fifth factor, prosecutorial considerations must be
evaluated, as a prosecutor may be more likely to recognize this
act by the client as one of "bumbling ignorance," rather than
one of willful violation of environmental laws. Although the ef-
fects of the act may be severe, prosecution will probably see min-
imal knowledge, willfulness, and recalcitrance on the part of the
client. Further, there may be some consideration given for the
client's good faith attempt to evaluate the situation. In the pres-
ent case, the client decided to assess the problem after discover-
ing possible error in the disposal of the lead. Hence, this good
faith act to address the problem provides further argument
against attorney disclosure.
Exclusion of prosecutorial considerations may have led the en-
vironmental attorney to weigh too heavily toward disclosure. In
light of the previous factors, this may have resulted in the attor-
ney still being in conflict on the issue of breaching confidential-
ity. The inclusion of the fifth factor allows the attorney to ac-
117. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAw GOVERNING LAWYERS,
§ l17A cmt. (d) (1996).
[Vol. IX
CERCLA AND CONFIDENTIAIMTY
count for the practical aspects of dealing with federal and/or
state prosecutors and arrive at a conclusion.
In the present case, it is not clear whether the client commit-
ted a crime. Further, the client appeared to be making a good
faith attempt to address the problem. Again, it is unclear
whether there are any continued deleterious effects from the
conduct. In this instance, CERCLA would not necessarily indicate
that this client has an obligation to report the act, as it is unclear
whether a crime was committed. Hence, it would benefit the en-
vironmental attorney to consider the various principles noted, in-
cluding weighing between a narrow versus broad conceptualiza-
tion of confidentiality, continuing versus past crime, and
prosecutorial considerations.
In particular, the inclusion of each factor provides further
analysis of the facts and practical circumstances of the case. The
consideration of a broad versus narrow interpretation, in the
present case, may allow an attorney to evaluate his/her value in
light of what the client is doing. The examination of whether the
act is a continuous or a past crime may lead the attorney to pur-
sue additional research to further enrich the analysis. Again,
such data may allow the attorney to arrive at a conclusion that is
grounded in current understanding of the potential environmen-
tal hazard. Finally, the inclusion of prosecutorial considerations,
in the present case, may reinforce the attorney's analysis, leading
to the conclusion that a breach of confidentiality is not
necessary.
CONCLUSION
The literature on confidentiality, as it applies to the environ-
mental attorney, reveals several principles in determining
whether the disclosure of client confidences is warranted. A
model incorporating all of these principles provides a compre-
hensive analysis of fact patterns in order to arrive at some resolu-
tion of some of the issues. Each factor increases the depth of
analysis, providing additional perspectives and/or the incorpora-
tion of additional facts. Furthermore, the inclusion of each fac-
tor in the analysis facilitates the difficult and delicate balancing
between withholding information and disclosure of confidences.
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However, as may be observed in the above hypotheticals, the
model does not provide a simple and definite answer to the issue
of disclosure of confidences. In some circumstances, the environ-
mental attorney may experience greater hesitation in deciding
between disclosure and non-disclosure. Further, the model does
not provide a simple resolution to the conflict between ethical
rules and CERCLA. The model does not provide a simple bal-
ancing test in determining the proper approach to these
problems. Rather, it provides an analytical framework by which
the complexity of facts and issues may be organized and ana-
lyzed. The factors are interactional, hopefully providing greater
comprehensiveness to the environmental attorney's analysis.
In many respects, however, the attorney still returns to the ba-
sic conflict between the duty to maintain confidential informa-
tion and the duty to prevent a client from committing a crime or
perpetrating a fraud.118 This is essentially the conflict between
balancing the needs of the client and the needs of society. In the
ideal situation, the attorney may serve both.
118. See Chattman & Kinburn, supra note 1, at 427.
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